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ABSTRACT 
Economic Efficiency of Grazing Systems 
by 
Muhammad Nazir 
Utah State University, 1972 
Major Professor : Dr . John P. Workman 
Department: Inter-departmental Economics 
viii 
Benefits and costs of implementing the specialized grazing systems 
on federal rangelands managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) were 
studied. First only the direct benefits and costs were used to determine 
the internal rates of return on the Bureau of Land Management investment s 
in grazing sys tems. Secondly, the eff ec ts of these systems on profits 
of private ranchers were determined. Finally the benefits and costs 
stream of the Bureau of Land Management and the changes in ranchers' 
profits were brought together to find out the ne t gain to society from 
investing the federal funds in specialized grazing systems. 
The internal rate of return on the Bureau of Land Management in-
vestments over an area of approximately 695,024 acres in Idaho, Nevada 
and Utah is 2.37 percent which is less than half the rate federal in-
vestments are expected to return (as measured by the federal government's 
c:os t of b.>rrcwing). t'.or e t;1an hal( of Lhe twenty tour allotment plans 
have negative rat es of return. Out of thirteen plans with negative 
rates of return only five have positive net returns and the rest hav0 
negative net returns. 
ix 
Specia lized grazing sys tems have improved the aggregate profits 
of the private ranchers by $ .036 for each pound of lives t ock produced . 
Federal investment in specialized graz ing systems may be justified if 
income distribution is considered a va lid reason for such ac tivi ties . 
If the stability and continuity of their operations is assured , ranc hers 
may be able to pay increased grazing fees. In view of the fact that 
und er public pressure the governmen t has decid ed to wi thdr aw rancher 
benefits in the form of grazing fees lower than market rates, incom e 
distribution appears to be poor grounds for justi fic ation of federal 
inv es tm ent. Also , given the incom e benefits to ranch operations, 
ranc hers themselves would undoubtedly want to invest in grazing systems 
on federal l and. However, rancher inves tment is unlikely s ince the 
Bureau of Land Management is already discouraging private permanent 
improvements on public lands. 
From the point of view of the Bureau of Land Management as a 
proprietary agent, the rea l cost of obtaining an increas e of a bundle 
of non-grazing benefits produced jointly with an animal un i t month of 
increased forage production is $0.53. A grazing fee of $1.74 per 
animal unit month would be required for the Bur eau of Land Managem ent 
to break even on investments in grazing systems . This is in spirt of 
the fact that l a rge federal investmen t s in necessary range improvements 
already existed before the i mplementation of the specialized grazing 
systems. It appears the investments in grazing systems on unimproved 
ranges are not justifiable in terms of direct r eturns to the Bureau 
of Land Management . 
X 
If the externality to the ranching segment of society is internal -
ized, specialized grazing systems more than pay for themselves if future 
benefits are discounted at the public discount rate. Besides the posi-
tive change in public goods, society gains $3.42 for each additional 
an imal unit month of grazing. Many questions are left unanswered 
such as quantifying and placing a dollar value on rangeland benefits 
claimed by the federal agencies. 
(97 pages) 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1970, there were 762 million ac r es of federal l y owned land in the 
United States. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) has exclusive respon-
sibili t y for adminis trating about 60 percent or 451 million acres of thi s 
federa lly owned land. Mor e t han half of this area is in the State of 
Alaska . The second l ar gest managing agency for federally owned lands is 
t he Forest Service with jurisd ic t ion over 24 percent of the acreage 
(United Sta t es Depar tment of Int erior, 1971, p. 1). 
In the 11 western coterminous s tates approximately 273 million ac r es 
of federal lands are grazed. The public l ands provide about 12 percent 
of total forage consumed by lives tock in the 11 western s tates and about 
3 percent of the total fora ge consumed in the en tire United St a te s 
(Public Land Law Review Commission, 1970, p. 105) . The very existence of 
many ranches as economic units depends on the availabi l ity of public 
rangelands. Grazing has been the l a r ges t single economic use of public 
lands . In 1969, the Bureau of Land Management co llected $5 ,37 9 , 253 from 
175,629,1 89 acres excluding Alaska (Unit ed States Department of Interior, 
1971, p. 86). Revenue collections will increase sharply with imple-
mentation of scheduled increases i n grazing f ees . 
Grazing on public lands occurs at differ en t seasons of the year 
d epending on vegetation, elevation of the area and climatic cond i tions . 
Generally foothills serve as sources of spr i ng and fall forage. Mountain 
ranges are grazed in summer and desert ranges in the winter. There is an 
integral r elations hip between public r a ngelands a nd private ranching 
operations. Therefore, policies of the agencies managing public lands 
affect the en tir e ranching operations . The objec tive of BLM range 
management practices is to "obtain high level sustained y ield s of forage 
for use by livestock and wildlife in balance with conservation needs and 
other multiple uses of land." (BLM, 1965, p. 4112.1). As a policy of the 
BLM , "management of livestock will be accomplished as a part of the 
Bureau' s continu ing program through ei ther (1) an accep t able allotment 
management plan or (2) designation of a grazing sys tem for the allo t men t 
or management area." (BLM, 1968, p. 15). For each management plan , a 
gr azing system1 i s r equired and must be described (BLM, 1968, p. 4112. 
15Cla). The 1970 Budget of the United States (U. S . President, 1970, p . 552) 
lis ted the impl ementation of allotment management plans incorporating "Ad-
vanced Gra zing Systems" as one of the activities of BLM f or which fund s 
are appropriated. The 1971 Bud ge t curtained the new plans, but old ones 
we r e allowed to be implemented (U. S. President, 1971, p. 536). Con-
ventionally livestock have had fr ee access to any part of the range. 
This is referred to as a continuous grazing system. However, t he con tin-
uous grazing system is not meant to be the one pr escribed and described 
in the agency manuals. This is ev idenced by Append i x A, wher e examples 
of grazing systems are reproduced from the BLM Manual and allotment plans. 
In practice , therefore, all the new systems are based on some kind of 
rotation or deferment of use. The se grazing systems are based on princ i-
ples of plant physiology a nd ecology (Appendix A). The sys t~ms a r e 
designed to optimize forag e and lives toc k production subj ec t t o the con -
s traint of not infringing upon o ther uses of public land s. The many 
ad vantages list ed for special iz ed grazing systems are all direct ed towa rd 
1For definition of t echnical terms , see App endix ~. 
3 
the ultimate objective of increasing plant cover and forage production. 
Not much is known about the cost of such increases. Since the Classifi-
cation and Multiple Use Act of 1964 (U.S. Congress, 1970, 18§§ 528- 31) 
the management plans include a paragraph or two on description of multiple 
uses and the plans are held responsible for maintenance of such uses. 
Each specialized grazing system is a new technique or a modification 
of previous technique of forage and livestock production on public ranges. 
Private ranchers conform to these rules of management with mixed reac-
tions. Favorable reaction can be interpreted to indicate higher privat e 
profits or the desi re t o avoid confrontation with the administrative 
agencies. Opposition to grazing systems may be due to resultant l ower 
profits or simply to general resistance t o change by a conservative 
sector of the society . 
Implementation of a grazing system involves additional costs on the 
part of both federal agencies and private ranchers. Fences are required 
to divide a range area into a numb er of units. Livestock are then 
periodically moved during the grazing season according to a predetermined 
program designed to provide the requirements of both livestock and 
plants. The erection of cross fences necessitates additional water devel-
opments, salting and increased livestock movements and c reates a forced 
feeding situation in the fenced units. 
This study investigates (a) returns to federal investment in grazing 
systPm~; (l:l) pffe'.:tS of gr3zing s~rste!lls on prcfitc of priv:1tz ranchcr3; 
and (c) the real cost of nongrazing benefits to (1) the BLM, and (2) the 
society at large. 
Grazing systems in retrospect 
The idea and even the practice of specialized grazing systems are 
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not new. Although August L. Hormay's controversial work in Harvey 
Val l ey brought the s pecialized systems into the limelight in the 1950 ' s, 
the Fores t Service had advanced the idea of deferred grazing as early as 
the beginning of the century . The list of studies on the advantages and 
disadvantages of specialized grazing systems is impressive, but they are 
all concerned with biological aspects of rangelands and absolute amounts 
of forage and lives t ock production. No systematic effort has been made 
to determine the profitability of the systems. 
Studies differ on the results attributed to rotational grazing 
systems . Earl ier controversies were reported i n part by Stoddart and 
Smith (1955). An excellent r eview of performance of grazing sys tems is 
gi ven by Heady (1961). Abs tracts and excerpts from one hundred and 
fif teen st udies on grazing management systems f r om 1895 to 1966 have 
bee n published by the U.S. Forest Service (1968). Most of t hese studies, 
which indicate superiority of specialized grazing sys terns i n total forage 
and lives tock production, a l so imply higher profits without any economi c 
basis . Even the relatively re cent studies are not unanimous in their 
views on grazing sys tems. An examination of twe nty-nine s tudies on 
grazing systems by the Forest Service reveal ed tha t : 
1. In 12 s tudies, lives t ock weight gains were gre a t e r unde r 
continuous g r azing as compared t o some other systems. 
2 . In 8 studies, livestock weight gains were gre a t e r unde r a 
specialized system as compared to continuous grazing . 
3. In 9 studies, there was no appreciable differen ce i n 
weight gains of lives tock unde r continuous grazing as 
cc,m{Jared tc.. sotne utbei.· dys ter.IS. 
4. Results of these studies s howed no consistent relation -
ship between livestock responses, a specific grazing 
system, and a particula r kind of vegetation. Local 
conditions, such as quantity and quality of vegetation, 
the management history of the animals, and the season 
apparently have profound effects on how animals r espond 
to a system and to the vegetation of the area. 
5. Thirty- nine studies compared the r esponses of vegetation 
measured by increases and decreases of desirable s pecies 
under continuous grazing versus some other systems ... In 
three studies, vegetation improved under continuous grazing. 
In 31 studies vegetation conditions declined under contin-
ous grazing as compared to other systems . In five studies 
there was no difference in vegetation under continuous and 
specialized sys tems of grazing. (U.S. Forest Service, 1967, 
p. 25) 
Biswell and Foster (1947) reported no appreciable differences in 
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forage density, species composition, or utilization as a result of rota-
tion grazing systems in switchcane (Arundinaria tecta) areas in eastern 
North Carolina, nor were there any significant differences in cattle 
weight gains under three systems; viz., (1) mid-season rotation grazing; 
(2) twenty-eight day rotation grazing; and (3) continuous grazing. 
Dillon (1958) summarized the results of an eight-year study of a 
deferred rotation system near Harrington, Washington, as follows: 
1. The system corrected a bad distribution problem. 
2. It was possible to get improvement over all the ranch, even 
though the key grasses had a different season of use. 
3. An even utilization of practically all forage. 
4. A 100 percent increase in carrying capacity. 
5. The quality of forage improved as reflected in heavier calves. 
Dillon and Wall~nmeyer ~966) further report deferred grazing as a 
means of improving range conditions. Hinton (1963) listed the following 
reasons for range rotation: 
1. Desirable plant species are given a chance to establish vigor. 
2. 8eed prod~ction of desirable pl~nts is imprcvcd. 
3. More uniform utilization 
4. Poor plant species are used to some extent. 
5. Increased plant cover enhances watershed values. 
6. Poisonous plants can be avoided by deferring use until they are 
safe. 
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7. Less riding is needed for distribution. 
Fisher and Marion (1951) in a six-year study on rest rotation graz -
ing on buffalo grass at the Agricultural Experiment Station , Spur, Texas, 
found that continuous grazing gave more uniform steer gains than rota-
tion grazing . A similar pattern was found in basal cover increases. 
Hubbard (1951) found conservative continuous grazing the most 
practi cal method of pasture use in western Canada, although increases in 
forage production were recorded from clipped plots under simulated rota-
tional grazing . 
According to Hormay and others (1958, 1969) a rest rotation grazing 
system on the Harvey Valley cattle allotments was designed t o remove the 
harmful effects of selective grazing by resting the range from grazing 
at appropriate intervals; and, thereby, to increase fo rage and livestock 
production. Rest rotation was said to improve the range condition. 
Construction of fences, water developments) and other grazing management 
fac ilities were listed as tools used for implementing the system; and no 
mention was made of the costs of these tools. 
Anderson (1940) reported an average of 65.1 pounds of beef per acre 
per grazing season on deferred pastures in Kansas compared t o 37.4 
pounds for the two season-long pastures. Deferre d grazing also provided 
protection against runoff and erosion during winter and spring. 
Lodge (1970) has listed studies indicating that special grazing 
systems we~e wore e{fecti.ve i n re~tor3ticn o: ~ve rg~azed r~nge3 ttan ~n 
increasing productivity of ranges in highly productive conditions. He 
also said that some modifications in delaying use, etc., are supe rior to 
continuous grazing. 
It is not uncommon to find statements resembling the one from Morris 
(1932, p. 211), "The additional expense required in fencing was more than 
offset by the increase in forage. It was found that the ac reage required 
for one head of stock could be reduced to 5 acres where it formerly took 
7 acres." Range was said to show as much as 53 percent increase in 
abundance of wheatgrass and a like increase in other valuable forage 
plants and a 36 percent increase of forage. 
Quite often implementation of a grazing system is confused with other 
improvement practices . This confounds the ensuing benefits. Bay (1964) 
reported that (1) development of watering points; (2) implementation of 
rest rotation grazing systems by building fences; and (3) spraying for 
weeds and brush were responsible for 10 percent more cattle run on the 
forests. Earlier, Frandsen (1950) categorized the management practices 
as: 
(a) Forage management practices 
(b) Facilitating and enabling practices 
(c) Special forage improvement practices. 
Under (a) above was noted rotation and deferred grazing, proper 
utilization, and fire prevention and protection. Stock water develop-
ment, fences, salting, and feed r eserves were included i n category (b). 
Brush control, fer tilization , and seeding were included in the last 
category. It was not made explicit whether fencing and watering are 
s~parate m::tnagenent prc:cti=.es o r .:m accessor; of r;r.:1zi ng systems. 
Workman and Hooper (1968) found fencing an unprofitable venture for 
getting better livestock distribution in mountain range areas in a study 
area covering 25,000 acres. They found guzzlers economical for private 
investment only. Trail building and ponds paid off for both federal and 
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private investment. Water development, fencing, salting, and trail 
t uilding are also tools of implementing grazing systems. Water develop-
ment and trail building will be carried out even ,.,ithout specialized 
systems, because they are found to be economica l. Then the question 
arises as to how the necessary components of grazing systems are identi -
fied. It seems appropriate to s urmise that if such tools were not used 
ear li er , but were used with the initiation of a grazing system, they 
must be required for the system. Thus, the assumption can be made that 
a grazing sys tem is the cause of introducing these distribution and 
improvement practices, and their costs should be inc luded in the cost of 
implementing the grazing system. 
Ratliff, Reppert and McConnan (1969) found that in 15 years of prac-
tice of r es t-rotation grazing in the Harvey Valley allotment, it cost 
the Forest Service 19 percent more than season-long grazing should have 
cost. An increase of 50¢ per Animal Unit Month in grazing fees would 
have been required to break even. Rest -rotation cost the permittees 
28 percent more than season-long grazing would have cost. About two 
third s of the cost was from weight losses in late season due to forced 
feeding characteristics of the system. 
A good description of the allocation of grazing permits by the 
Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management is given by Gardner (1963b). 
In spite of any misallocation of grazing permits as brought out by 
Gardner (1962), the new management plans incorporating rotational grazing 
do not claim to rectify this. Thus, the performance of any specialized 
system needs to be tested with the exis ting levels of allocative 
efficiency. Determination of the cost of this misallocation is a 
separat e problem . Martin and Jefferies (1966) doubted that misallocation 
could be the whole reason for div er gence between actual and expected 
values of grazing permits. 
Notwithstanding the dependency and commensurability requirements 
along with priorities of use pointed out by Gardner (1962), the exis t ence 
of markets for rang e permits was proved by Roberts (1967) and Jensen 
and Thomas (1968). One would expect the effect of the federal agencies' 
decision on a grazing system to be reflected in changes in permit values 
and values of private base property similar to increases in land prices 
under Tobacco Acreage Controls estimated by Hartman and Tolley (1961). 
However, the recommendations of the Public Land Law Review Commission 
(1970) asking that a fair market value be cha r ged fo r grazing public 
lands and the subsequent hike in grazing fees by the Department of 
Interior and Department of Agriculture, raises serious questions as to 
whether the permit values will now reflect the true diver gence between 
effective marginal value product and marginal factor cost on federal 
gr azing l ands. Hence, the approach followed below appears appropriate 
since all the direct and indirect costs of the ranch operator s must be 
considered. 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL PROBLEM 
Since there are many dire c t and implied benefits provided by vegeta-
tion on public lands, there is a tendency to identify the forage produced 
as a social, collective, or public good. 1 A closer look at public lands, 
their products, and their relationships confirms the abundance of public 
goods on these lands . Yet all is not of the nature of public goods . 
There are goods which are public and there are those which are private. 
Also, there are goods which are both. Forage available on public range-
lands comes under the latter category. It is a private good when sold 
freely in the market, competing with other sources of supply. This 
legitimacy of being a private good is derived from its being an input in 
livestock production. The market value of livestock produced by ranchers 
on these lands is in no way shrouded in mysterious clouds of social good-
ness. At the same time it is a public good when every American can 
derive satisfaction from a well-preserved and "natural" landscape, and 
1
social, collective, and public goods are different terms for non-
private goods with slight variation in meanings attached by the expositor 
of each definition. Samuelson (1954, p. 387) defined private goods as 
those "which can be parcelled out among Jndividuals" and collective goods 
as those "which all enjoy in common •... " In extension of this treat -
~ent Samu~Jscn (l95e, p. 335) cf=ered three cate£ories: pu<e private 
goods, pure public goods, and a mixed model. He defined public goods as 
"simultaneously entering into many person's indifference curves." 
Musgrave (1969 , p. 798) reviews definitions of social goods from Wicksell 
and Lindh al 's writings as thos e "the cons umption of which is non-rival." 
In this study, the term public goods will be used to include all 
goods which are not purely private. Any departures from these two 
categories will be dealt with separately outside the scope of these 
terms. 
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merely knowing that these things exist somewhere in the west. Plants, 
in their capacity as public goods, also provide habitat to organisms, 
wildlife, and consuming or intruding man. 
The mixture of goods and their production possibilities can be made 
more explicit by the following exposition. 
Let X be the inputs a t the disposal of the BLM which can be poten-
i 
tially used for range forage produLtion for domestic livestock. There 
can be Bi sets of goods produced involving Fi production functions, 
where i = 1 to m. The ith set is produced by ith production function. 
One of these sets (B1) is composed of the goods produced in the range 
enterprise. These sets can be defined as below: 
s1 {B1 , .. . ,Bm}, a set of competitive enterprises 
B1 {Q1 , ... ,Qj } , a set of jointly produced goods where Q1 is 
forage production 
~1 {Q2, ... ,Qj} 
B2 {Qj+l'""" ,Qn}' a set of goods which are produced using Q1 
in addition to Xi. They compete with live-
stock production for Q1 after initial stages 
of complementarity and supplementarity. 
The elements of set s1 can be described as po tent ial rivals in the 
use of range land; such as , forag e , timber, surface mining, campgrounds, 
and even homesites. B
1 
is comprised of a set of jointly produced goods; 
such as, forage, pure water, stable soil, wildlife habitat, and soil 
organic matter. Range land serves in a dual capacity; viz., as an input 
in forage production and as home for the user s of forage. Similarly, 
plant species which produce forage serve as a direct input in the form 
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of food for livestock and other animals and also provide cover for wild-
lif e of all kinds. 
Different species of game animals which use range forage as a 
direct input fall into the category of goods produced under B2 . Since 
this study is limited to cattle only , other domes tic livestock allowed 
onto federal rangelands are also el emen ts of this set of goods. Dif-
ferent animals prefer diff erent plant species and plant parts. Big 
game and domestic livestock do not compete for the same plant materials 
with moderate stocking rates. At lower stocking rates the two types of 
animals increase the available forage supply for each other by affecting 
intraspecific competi tion between plants. However, animal compe tit ion 
for forage sets in as the stocking rates increase and the seasons of 
range use by livestock are prolonged. The initial complementary and 
supplementary relationships between big game and cattle wer e studied by 
Smith and Doell (1968 , pp. 1-32) and between sheep and cattle by Cook 
(1954, pp. 10-13) . Hopkin (1954, pp. 170-5) used Cook ' s results to draw 
some economic conclusions about the supplementary and competitive ranges. 
Since the rate of production of public goods is not determined in 
the market, assume the rate of production of goods produced in B2 fixed 
at B2 , 0 by a socio-political pressure mechanism. This would require 
setting aside a fixed rate of forage for this purpose. The residual is 
the supply of forage to the ranching industry. Also assume that the 
rate of production of goods in ~ l' that is (B3 , ... ,Bm) is fixed at a 
level that does not interfere with the use of forage by domestic live-
stock. 
Let 
Q1 total forage produced on federal ranges 
13 
forage reserved for B2 
forage supply for production of domestic 
livestock 
A specific rate of QlL is leased to ranchers after all the considerations 
for B2 have been met. The rate of Ql,O and consequently that of Ql,L 
was established at the time of adjudications. 2 The practice has been to 
quantify AUM ' s of Ql,L in terms of both livestock numbers and grazing 
season length. Ql,O has not received a similar treatment. The new 
management plans do attempt to bridge this gap, but still the ultimate 
prob lem of quantifying all products in B2 has not been tackled and the 
boundary between Ql,O and Ql,L may be somewhat blurred. 81 (the goods 
jointly produced wi.th Q1 ) are still at a very primitive stage of quanti-
fication. However, their quantification can be circumvented by concen-
trating on the measurement of changes in Q1 because positive changes in 
B1 occur with increases in Q1 . Therefore, any changes from Ql,L to Ql:L 
indicate an increase in production of B1 . This is synonymous with mea-
su ring a change of Q{ to Qi'in orde r to draw conclusions about the beha-
vior of B1 . 
In spite of considerable evidence that grazing systems, as an exante 
concept, are meant to increase forage for livestock in the form of 
2The Q' L rate of Q1 is called a class I grazing permit. Adjudica-tion was not 'carried out at the same time for all rangelands. In some 
grazing districts it is still going on. However, uniformity is attained 
in the sense that grazing systems have invariably been started on the 
allotment where adjudication was already completed. (See Definition of 
Terms, Appendix G) 
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immediate increases in permitted numbers or avoiding cuts in permits 
together with maintaining all other uses at their existing levels, the 
motives behind grazing systems initiation can be delineated as below: 
1. Increase in Ql (livestock forage) 3 
2. Increase in B1 (goods produced jointly with Q1 ) 
3. Increase in both Q1 and Bl. 
The choice between 1 and 2 above is a function of pressure groups and 
the subjective evaluation of these pressures. The third choice is a 
convenient, but relevant afterthought for most administrators. 
The s t age is now set for investigating the relevant economic aspects 
of the choice situations 1, 2, and 3 above. In all three cases the 
existence of three interest groups are assumed. 
1. BLM as a proprietary agent of the U.S. gove rnment managing 
one of the government's enterprises: a case of public enter-
prise 
2. The private ranchers: a case of private enterprise using a 
product of public enterprise 
3. BLM as an agent of the sovereign: a case of public finance. 4 
3This can be confirmed from most of the management plans incorporat-
ing the grazing systems. Each plan describes the range, records the past 
and present grazing use, and lays down a certain level of forage pro-
duction as its objective. Usually a paragraph appears for description 
of other uses, but generally no more than this. These plans are availa-
ble from the BLM district offices. 
4BLM as an agent of the Sovereign is assumed to be responsible for 
all social costs and social benefits. The government of the United 
States is the sovereign. Public enterprises are a subset of the 
activities of the sovereign. As a proprietary agent, the BLM is 
responsible for direct internal benefits and costs only. 
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BLM as a proprietary agent 
Under the assumption of being a proprietary agent of the government, 
the BLM is responsible for explicit statements of benefits and costs. 
Working within the assumption of the BLM goal of increasing QlL' benefits 
include only additional revenue accruing to the BLM from increased AUM's 
of forage. The additional revenue is based on a set of administered 
prices . Congress has agreed in principle that administered prices will 
recover the full market value of forage from grazing lands. Though 
efforts are underway to raise the administered prices to a level dictated 
by the market prices, it will take a few more years to achieve this. A 
case can be made against the advisibility of ranking the investments 
where arbitrary prices are administered. But in the case of forage from 
public land, since the need to change the prices has been recognized and 
progress is being made towards this end, it is imperative that we use the 
actual prices in practice (whether administered or market determined). 
One of the explicit techniques of ranking nvestments is the internal 
rate of r e turn. More will be said about this in Chapter Ill. For the 
objective of producing forage for livestock, changes in B2 are external 
to the BLM in its role as a proprietary agent. Similarly, any effects 
on profits of ranchers cannot be included in the benefits category under 
the proprietary role of the BLM. As we shall see later, the products 
other than forage are freed from the externality label when the assump-
tions about the role of the ELM are relaxed. 
For the BLM as a proprietary agent with an objective of increasing 
jointly produced public goods, any production of B1 involves the pro-
duction of a joint product, Ql,L' which is sold in the market and which 
offsets some of the cost of producing B1 . This still l eaves effects on 
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ranchers ' profits as an externality which cannot be coun t ed as a benefit 
under the assumed proprietary role of the BLM. The changes in the ele-
ments of the set B1 are not described in conventional economic units. 
An increase in Q1 also i nd icates increases in B1 . The exact determina-
tion of the function B1 = f (Q1 ) is not available for all the elements 
of B1 . However, in the bargaining pro cess for acquiring more federal 
funds , such relationships ar e used and can, therefore, be determined by 
a s ubjective evaluation of technical and non-technical relationships by 
BLM officials and the supervising congressional authority. Any cost of 
increasing Q1 and, thereby, B1 is expressed as a per unit cost of the 
addition al Q1 , since the changes are in lump s um quantities. Any returns 
from the sale of the joint product (Q 1) can then be deducted from this 
cost to determine the real cos t per unit of the increase of Q1 . 
The behavior of the BLM as a proprietary agent with an objective of 
increasing both forage for livestock and jointly produced goods and the 
treatment of cos ts and revenues do not differ from that of the BLM work-
i ng for the objective of i ncreas ing B1 . 
Private ranchers using forage from federal lands 
Any BLM actions not only change the supply of forage, but also the 
method of its use in production of livestock. The BLM actions are 
unlikely to affect the prices of inputs of livestock production on 
federal rangelands. The only exception may be the price of forage. 
This is not likely, due to two reasons. First, grazing allotments 
received cuts at the time of adjudications which preceeded the implemen-
tation of grazing systems and present attempts are restoring these cuts . 
Second, the forage from public lands, though an important so urce of 
supply in the western states , is a small part o f the total s upply o f forage . 
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Changes in rates of outputs and inputs oc cur over time throughout 
the business world. Temporal changes in use of inputs must be recognized 
before the changes due to exogenous factors such as the BLM decisions can 
be detected. To illustrate this point, let us assume a rate of use of 
inputs be fore the introduction of grazing systems as xi,O' so that a rate 
of livestock product ion of YO is achieved. 
After implementation of the systems, we detect Y1 rate of produc-
tion using ~~l rate of inputs. Part of this change (Y1 - Y0 ) will be 
due to change in inpu t s (Xi,l - xi,O)' and part due to a shift in the 
production function. Using the same amounts of inputs , higher output is 
achieved . Yl' production of livestock after implementation of grazing 
systems using xi,O rates of inputs, will have to be compar ed with Y0 to 
detect the latter effect. Determination of this change provides an 
answer not only to the ranchers' acceptance or rejection of grazing 
systems , but also provides a missing link in the stream of benefits and 
costs in the analysis of the BLM's role as an agent of the society at 
large . 
BLM as an agent of the Sovereign 
BLM's last (but not the least important) responsibility 
agent of the socie ty at large, demands that all social benefits and 
costs be reckoned within any benefit-cost analysis. To e lucidate the 
economic behavior of the BLM in this regard, it is necessary to treat 
the determination of benefits as a political process. In this r ole, the 
BLM counts three forms of benefits: 
1. Increased Q1 leading to an increase in grazing fee revenue 
2. I ncreased B1 
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3. Increased income of ranchers due to changed technical rela-
tions between inputs and outputs. 
Numbers 1 and 3 above can be expressed in dollars . The B1 are not quan-
tifiable in conventional economic units. We can, however, go a step 
further than we did while considering the ELM a proprietary agent with 
the objective of increasing Q1 and B1 or both. The real cost of addi-
tional 81 associated with the increase of Ql,L will be further reduced 
if the effects on incomes of private ranchers are positive. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE MODEL 
Rate of r e turn on the public enterprise 
The measuring stick of success of investment of federal funds by the 
BLM as a proprietary agent of the U.S. will be the internal rate o f return. 
It can be defined as that rate "which discounts future earnings of a pro-
ject down to a present value equal to the pr oject cost." (Dean, 1954, 
p. 128) It is based on the principle that in making an inves tment outlay 
we are buying a series of future annual incomes. I t is gene rally calcu-
lated by solving for i in the equation 
I R 
1 - (1 + i) -n 
[ i 
where I cos t of original investments in improvements 
R annual net revenue 
n = time period for which R is received 
i internal rate of return. 
The right hand side of the above equation is the present value of the net 
annual returns. The internal rate of return is that discount rate at 
which the present value of the net cash flows is zero. That i s 
R 0. 
In spite of wide variation in use of techniques of determining rates of 
return, it is not uncommon to find the use of internal rate of return in 
studies of investments in natural resources (Gardner, 1961, 1963a; Workman, 
1970; Neilsen, 1967). Gardner (196~ deplored the diversity of techniques 
and recommended the use of the internal rate of return as a standard 
technique. 1 The BLM's investment in grazing systems has its immediate 
competitors not in corporate activities of the private market, but in 
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other investment opportunities of the BLM. Next in line are the federal 
projects by other agencies of the Department of Interior and other U.S. 
Departments in order of decreasing relevance for comparisons. The BLM's 
expenditure on grazing systems is a small part of total developmental funds 
budgeted by the political process. 2 Estimation of an explicit rate of 
return is thus required for ranking purposes. In the treatment of the BLM 
as a proprietary agent, externalities are left out to be considered by the 
political process. Thus, increased revenue from grazing fees will be the 
only benefit included in the ranking process. 
Without offering further excuses for using this very prevalent, but 
also much disputed technique of ranking investments, it needs to be 
pointed out that the uniqueness of this study is not in the technique 
being used, but in the area of its application. 3 
1There can be multiple internal rates of return for projects with 
large negative cash flows towards the end of their life. Gardner (1963) 
cautioned against this possibility, but dismissed it on the ground that it 
is not likely in range improvements. Arrow and Levhari (1969) and Flemming 
and Wright (1971) wrestled with the same problem by suggesting that for 
projects whose life can be costlessly truncated to maximize their present 
value, the internal rate of return will be unique, that is, the maximized 
present value is monotomic decreasing function of the discount rate. The 
internal rate of return method assumes the reinvestment of returns from 
projects of different life spans at the internal rate of return to achieve 
a common terminal date. 
2In 1970, out of a total budget outlay of $1,953 billion by the U.S. 
Government, the BLM was allocated $53,980 thousand. The range manage-
ment program was estimated to cost $5,234 thousand (United States 
President, 1970). 
3The major rival technique to the use of internal rate of return is 
the present value method. See Hirshleifer (1959). 
Changes in profi t s of private ranchers 
For the ranching firms involved in livestock production, profit is 
the difference be tween revenues and cos ts. This c an be written as 
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production func tion 
y 
Y = pounds of lives tock sold 
P price of product Y 
y 
pi= price of fact ors xi' where i 
x1 fixed capital 
x 2 working capital 
x 3 labor 
1, 2, and 3 
The ai are assumed to be fixed for the firms within the industry. 
The advanced grazing sys tems developed and implemented by the BLM 
are of the nature of exogenous technology from the viewpoint of private 
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ranche rs. This comes about because of the BLM' s investment, plus regula-
tion of the format of production processes using the same combination of 
inputs. Actions of the BLM can be made a function of time; and, thus, 
any changes in the production function can be depicted as 
This is a comprehensive scheme to measure all changes exogenous to firms. 
However, for the specific problem of measuring the effect of BLM action 
in th e form of specialized grazing systems , it will suffice to assume 
a dis cre te change from time period 0 to 1, during which the grazing 
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s ystems have been implemented. Then, 
a a2 a3 
Yo Ao (X 1 1 x2 x3 
a a2 a3 
yl Al (X 1 1 x2 x3 
Assuming no change in relative prices, the prices of the base year (1965) 
can be inflated by a price index to match those of 1970. Using the same 
levels of inputs and constant prices overtime, the change in profit can 
be written as 
p (X al a2 a3 ) (Al - AO) y 1 x2 x3 
a a2 a3 
LI TI 
p (X 1 x2 x3 ) (LIA) liA 1 p 
Yo = al a2 a3 Ao y 
AO(Xl x2 x3 
liA be estimated as below . 5 can 
A. 
5
rhis is adopted from Solow (1957). He showed that a technical 
change in a Cobb-Douglas production function Q = A (t) (KL) with A (t) 
measuring accumulated affect of shifts overtime can be es timated from 
changes in output and inputs if the production function is known. Dif-
ierentiating totaily with respe ct to time and dividing by Q, he gets 
~·= ~·+ aQ ~ ~·+ ~~~·when dots indicate time derivatives. Q A oK Q K aL Q L 
A" Q" 3Q K K" oQ L L" 
By rearranging this equation, we obtain A= Q- aKQK- aL Q L · 
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M /W 
A y 
In this equation CY1 , CY 2 , and CY3 are unkno"s. In a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function, coefficients ai of the log form of the function can be 
estimated by the least squares method. This is quite s traight forward if 
the Xi come from an experiment. However, in the market situation we are 
dealing with amounts of Xi ar e dependent on each other, which may inflate 
the sample variances (Johnston, 1963, p. 179). Theref ore , the Best 
Linear Unbiased Estimator properties of classical least squares regression 
do not hold. That is, the expected value of matrix e e' is not equal to 
a
2
r, wher e e is a vector of disturbances. This problem can be overcome 
by assuming that the sampling error is the same function of the distur-
bance vec tor e as the es timator itself is of the independent vector Y. 
Then the least squares es tima tor is still the Best Linear Unbiased 
Estimator (Theil, 1971, p. 119). Aitken's generalized Gauss-Markov least 
squar es theorum can, therefore, be appl ied t o estimate a positive definite 
matrix n , so that the Best Linear Unbiased Estimator can be found. That 
is, 
b = (X ' n-l X)-l (X' n-l Y) 
and the variance Ebb = a2 (X ' ~~-l X) -l 
where X is a matrix of independent variab l es, Y is a vector of dependent 
variables, and ~ is a nonsingular variance-covariance matrix of the 
disturbance term. 
This estimator is the classical least s quares estima tor in a trans-
fotmed probiem (Gold berger, 1Y64, p. 2~3 ). However, since we are unable 
to say anything about the variance-covariance matrix of the disturbance 
term, we cannot r e ly on Aitken's generalized Gaus s -Markov least squares 
theorum. To eliminate these problems the factor s har es method is employed 
in this study to es timate "'f· This was earlier used by Kl e in, and then 
further developed by Nerlove (N erlove , 1965 , p. 65). The following method 
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gives consistant and unbiased estimates of ~-
l F plf xlf Ln a1 L F f=l pyf yf 
1 F p2f x2f Ln a2 F L pyf yf ~1 
where ai ' Pi' Xi, andY are the same as defined earlier. f = (l, .•. ,F) = 
number of ranching firms involved. This procedure assumes constant returns 
a l a2 a3 
to scale and the production function as Yf =A x1 x2 x3 e(that is, 
the error term is not associated with a.) . 
1 
The assumption of constant returns to scale and use of factor shares 
as a means of estimating the parameters of a production function is based 
on the exhaustion of the product in payments to factors involved according 
to their marginal productivity. This method does not apply where increas -
ing returns to scale prevail, because total output is not enough to pay 
the factors their marginal physical products. Increasing returns to 
scale ensure the breakdown of marginal cost pricing, and thus rule out 
the existence of numerous firms. As long as there are many firms of all 
sizes in a market with no clear trend towards a single firm size, we can 
rule out the existence of increasing returns to scale. 
Cost of jointly produced public goods 
Objective three focuses the attention on the production of public 
goods which are jointly produced with livestock forage. The desired 
level of production is determined by society. The only thing the BLM, 
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as a proprietor of the public goods enterprise, can identify and quantify, 
i s the cos t of the forage. Since the jointly produced public goods, some 
of which themselves are not quant ifiable, are a func tion of the fo r age 
increase, the r elevant question is the cost of a unit of forage increase. 
Le t the cost of jointly produced public goods produced with one unit of 
additional forage be denoted by cb. 
EC EC 
Et>Q1 = EMUM 
where C is the additional cos t of livestock forage production including 
depreciation, interest, and maintenance of improvements and the manage-
ment cos t s. But as pointed out earl ier, the product forage itself is 
sold; and t his sal e reduces the average addi tiona l cos t . Therefore, the 
r eal cost to the BLM as a proprietary agent a ttempting t o i ncrease B1 
will be Cb - PQl where PQl is the effective price of an AUM , which is 
psid by the ranchers . 
This leads us to the conside r ations for the entrepr eneur s of the 
last resort, that is, socie t y . From the viewpoint of socie t y, any exter-
nali ty unpaid for, but accruing to one of i ts own members , should also 
be reckoned with. The value of this externality accruing to the ran-
che rs grazing BLM lands per unit of livestock output is ll! • Py. The 
liA 
t otal value of the externality = ~ . Py • Y, where Y is the tota l live-
stock weight produced on the rangelands covered by the al lotment plans 
s tudied. The value of externali.tv pe r un it. of f orage change ts 
LlA 
A . P • y 
s EAUM 
From the viewpoint of BLM as an agen t of the Sovereign, the r eal cost of 
the public goods increase (B1) is Cb - PQl- S. It is this cost agains t 
which the subjective estimate of the potential increase in B2 should be 
compared when the BLM asks for public funds to increase nongrazing 
benefits. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The internal rate of return on 
BLM investments 
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All the grazing allotments studied included some improvement struc-
tures before the decisions were made to bring them under specialized 
grazing systems. Considerations of boundary demarcation, livestock 
distribution, better forage utilization, seeding, spraying or mere public 
relations were responsible for the fences, trails and water developments. 
But, once a decision was made to implement a specialized grazing system, 
each plan required an inventory of existing improvements and land fea-
tures. Systems were then designed to use the existing structures and to 
provide additional improvement structures. In this study only the addi-
tiona! costs incurred for the specialized systems are considered an 
investment cost for the grazing systems. It is obvious that it would cost 
much more to implement a specialized grazing system on previously unim-
proved rangelands, but such entirely unimproved ranges are hard to find 
these days. So the plans studied are typical of the prevailing condi-
tions and the design of systems is typical of contemporary specialized 
grazing systems. Full production capacity is not reached immediately 
upon installation of improvements for grazing systems. This is evidenced 
by the estimated schedule of forage production in Appendix C. These 
estimates were given by BLM officials based on their past experiences 
and design characteristics of the system involved. After the initial 
outlay of investment cost, the annual costs are constant, but annual 
returns are not. The nonuniform behavior of additional annual forage 
production due to specialized grazing systems is shown in Figure 1. 
The estimated increase in forage production is expected to level out 
after 1980. The forage increase is assumed to be uniform during the 
installment period. 
The sale price of an AUM of forage is not uniform overtime. The 
BLM and Forest Service adopted a system of pricing of forage for public 
lands in 1967, based on a study of user charges released by the Bureau 
of the Budget in 1964. It was calculated that in 1966 prices, a fee of 
$1.23 per AUM would capture the full market value of forage after 
accounting for the users' costs difference on public and private lands. 
This figure was to be achieved in a period of 10 years starting in 1969 
(Public Land Law Review Commission, 1970, p. 117, and Nielsen, 1971). 
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In 1967, the BLM raised the grazing fee to $0.44 from the previous 
three year rate of $.33 per AUM. A congressional moratorium on further 
fee hikes held the grazing fee at $.44 in 1970. The fee increase resumed 
in 1971 with the fee rising to $.64. It seems certain that the policy of 
raising fees to $1.23 per AUM on public grazing lands will be implemented, 
though the increases may not be uniform. For purposes of calculating the 
value of returns on investment in specialized grazing systems, it is 
assumed that the target year of 1978 will be met for restoring the 
parity of grazing fees to their desired level. In 1970 prices, this 
level is $1.36 per AUM. The assumed grazing fee schedule is given Jn 
Table 1. The cost of maintenance and administration of each plan is 
uniform overtime. The initial investments do not occur in a single year. 
Also the initial investments are repeated in the future to give all 
improvements an equal life span. The aggregate flow of gross returns 
Total forage ir.crease 
(Thousands of AL~'s) 
.. ···· 
_,.-'' 
40 
30 
20 
~-~-·----~--L--L--L--L~~-L~--~~--~-L------~ 
Installation 0 1 
period 
3 4 5 6 8 9 10 Years 50 
Figure 1. Patterns of forage increase from specialized grazing systems. (Solid line 
shows actual and estimated forage increase. The dotted line is assumed 
increase) , 
N 
'"' 
30 
Table 1. Assumed grazing fee schedule in 1970 prices 
Ye ar Grazing Fee. 
1970 0.44 
1971 0.64 
1972 0.74 
1973 0.84 
1974 0.94 
1975 1.04 
1976 1.14 
1977 1.24 
1978 1.36 
1979 onwards 1.36 
~his schedule for raising grazing fees is independent of grazing systems. 
and costs is shown in Figure 2. Additional returns from the grazing 
systems are graphed above the horizontal axis and additional costs are 
shown below the horizontal axis. 
The nonuniform returns and costs require a computational modifica-
tion of the general formula of the internal rate of return given in 
l - (1 + i)-n 
Chapter III. The discount factor ( i ) is applicable to the 
uniform costs of maintenance and administration. The modification of the 
formula below compounds the past and discounts the future returns and 
costs. The uniform and nonuniform changes are discounted separately. 
This modification still employs the criterion that the present value of 
gross returns equal the present value of costs. 
Actual and Estimated Returns 
Total Additional Returns Assumed Returns 
(Thousands of Dollars) Annual Cost 
100 
Lumpsum I nves tments 
-----------------------~---- ---
Total Additional Costs 
Figure 2. Aggregate f low of gross returns and costs from BLM investments over time. 
w 
,._. 
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Tha t is, I R where 
C(l - 1 ) 
n 
(1 + i ) S-j (l+i)n 1 I Io + (Ij + Cj) + + E ck (l+i) k j=l i k=l 
1 1 
R R 
n 
(1 - (i+i)n - (1 - (l+i)m) 
i + 
1 
E ~ ( (l+i)k) + 
k=l j=l 
m 
R. (l+i) S-j 
J 
The present value of cash flows = R - I where 
I 0 cost of investments in zero period (1970) 
Ij investment in the jth year of installmen t 
S installment period (5 years f rom 1966 t o 1970) 
n number of years the returns are expected 
C annual cost for n years 
Cj annual cost in the jth year of installment 
ck future i nvestment needed in the kth year 
Rn gross returns which are uniformly re ceived from m + 1 to n years 
~ gross returns in the kth year 
Rj gross return in the jth year of installation 
i internal rate of return. 
The general formula for the internal rate of return is known for 
its unwieldness. The above formulation is even more difficult to solve 
fat" i. A f'rotrA.P IV comput~r pr0gr'1I'l wa.c;; u~P..C' to suh~ti*:t~te various 
values of i into the equation until I = R was satisfied. A range of i 
from -300% to 30% was tested. The results should be viewed with this 
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range of i values in mind. An i nterval of .001 was used for interactions. 1 
With the cost of investment, annual expenses and schedule of future 
returns given in Appendix C, the aggregate internal rate of return on 
BLM inves tments on the grazing allotments studied is 2.3687 percent. To 
check for the uniqueness of this result, the present values are graphed 
in Figure 3. Aggregate present values are a mono tonically decreasing 
function of the discount rate (with the exception of zero, where the 
above equation is undefined). 
The individual internal rates of return on the twenty-four allot-
ments vary from -100 percent to 18.548 percent. These rates are reported 
in Table 2 . These rates fall into three general categories: (1) i > 0; 
(2) 0 > i > -1; and (3) i ~ -1. 
The graphs of present values of cash flows from projects with posi-
tive internal rates of return resemble the graph of aggregate returns in 
Figure 3 . The present value graph of positive absolute net returns, but 
negative inte rnal rates of return is shown in Figure 4. The third 
category ; viz., the projects with negative net returns, and thus with 
internal rates of return ~ -1 may have more than one solution as shown 
in Figures 5 and 6 . This figure is based on calculations using n as odd 
year. In this study n is 60 years , which is a common multiple of life 
spans of different improvements. This is an even number, &,d with i < -1; 
and, therefore, (1 + i) < 0, the term (1 + i)n gives contradictory results 
as compared to t:l>e lCE'Sult.s wJ.th n as M ocld nnmb"r. J.n the s;.II'p lP. ve.,~?ion 
1This formulation is an nth degree polinomial. Hirshleifer (1959, 
p. 225) shows that the present value of cash flows can become zero as 
many times as the sign of receipt stream reverses; that is, for a period 
of n years, the present value can be come zero n- 1 times. However, the 
range of the rates of discounts tested for this study is quite reasonable. 
Other solutions are rejected. 
Thousands of dollars 
400 
300 
200 
100 
-01 0 
-100 
Figure 3. Present value of cash flows from BLM investments on 24 
grazing allotments. 
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Thousands of dollar& 
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Inter es t Rate 
EjgurP. 4. Prese~t v~~e of cu£h ~ lows fr~n a~ e llo tmen t with i nte=·· 
nal rate of return > -1 and < 0.0 (Spratling Allotment Nevada) . 
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Dollars 
- 2 1 2 
Interest rate 
-(10)40 
-(10)60 
Figure 5. Present value of cash flows from BLM investment on 
Adorno Allotment when n is an odd year . 
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Dollars 
-2 -1 l 2 
Interest rate 
-(10)60 
Figure 6. Present value of cash flows from BLM investment on Steptoe 
unit allotment when n is an odd year. 
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Figure 7. Present value of cash flows from BLM investment on Adorno 
Allotment when n is an even year. 
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Figure 8. Present value of cash flows from BLM investment on Steptoe 
unit allotment when n i s an even year. 
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Table 2. The internal rates of return on BLM investment on 24 grazing 
allotments in Idaho, Nevada and Utah (Appendix C) 
Allotment Internal Rate Allotment Internal Rate 
Number of Return Number of Return 
1 < -1 0 13 < -1 0 
2 .159812 14 .117613 
3 .091533 15 < -1 0 
4 .123513 16 - .018907 
5 .075840 17 .007134 
6 .182715 18 < -1 0 
.140318 19 .185480 
8 - .25605 20 < - 1 0 
9 - .180149 21 .022101 
10 - . 024033 22 < -1 0 
11 .078854 23 < -1 0 
12 - .050346 24 < -1 0 
of net cash flows equal to R(l - (l!i)n)/i -I, of Chapter III, there is 
no solution for the internal rate of return, because the net cash flows 
curve never reaches zero (Workman and Gardner, 1971). 2 For the modifi-
cation employed in this study, there is no difference between the shapes 
of net cash flows curves using n as odd or even numbers for discount 
2
workman and Gardner came to this conclusion while working with net 
returns which would satisfy the internal rate of return equation at 
different discount rates. They did not deal with the case of recurring 
investments. 
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rates greater than -1, as shown in Figures 4, 5 , 6, and 7. Figures 4 and 
5 show the present value of cash flows using n as odd number. Figures 
6 and 7 are based on n as even number, but correspond to the returns and 
costs of Figures 4 and 5 r espectively. To eliminate the inconsistency for 
discount rates less than -1, all time periods are treat ed as odd numbers. 3 
Thus, Figures 5 and 6 represent the assumed behavior of the present value 
of the cash flows of projects with negative returns. These values of cash 
flows remain negative for dis count rates > -1. They may or may not cross 
3The general formula of internal rate of return and 
I 
1 
R(l- ~n+l) 
i __ R_ are algebraically equivalent. This can (l+i)n+l 
be shown by setting the right hand side of both equations equal . 
1 
R(l- ~n) 
i 
1 
R(l- ~n) 
i 
~ R(l+i)n _ R R(l+i)-n-l 
Therefore, i - --i--- i- i R(l+i)-n-l. By deducting~ 
R(l+i) -n 1 
and adding i - and R(l+i) -n- on both sides, we get 
R(l+i)-n-1 R(l+i)-n - R(l+i)-n-l 
i 
R(l+i)-n~l 
="-'-'=ci:--.:._ ( l+i -1 ) R(l+i)-n-1. 
Both sides are equal. This still leaves the conversion of the even 
nJrr.bcr to an odj in the ~nitial pericd up to ycur ffi and any lutcr even 
year when recurring investment occurs. An approximation was used for the 
second term in the modified formula. The returns in the even years were 
assumed to have been received half in the year before and half in the 
year after. 
42 
the horizontal axis for discount rates < -1 at one or more points depend-
ing on the timing and amounts of costs incurred. The only conclusion 
which can be reached from these figures is that the investments with such 
cash flows curves have internal rates of returns less than or equal to -1. 
The aggregate internal rate of return of 2.37 percent as well as the 
rates of return on individual allotments (Table 2) may be biased upwards 
because they are calculated from projected returns and actual costs. In 
each allotment there are further investments planned. It is quite pos-
sible that in spite of my cautioning the BLM officials to use the 
existing form and substance of the system in estimating future returns, 
consideration of some of the planned improvements might have entered into 
their estimates, Still a rate of 2.37 percent is low even compared to 
the public discount rate of 5.125 percent for 1970, announced by the 
Water Resources Council ( 1970, Document N~ . 70-9567). 
Unless due considerati.on is gi.ven to the income. distribution and public 
good aspects of grazing systems, it appears that society is paying a high 
cost for such investments in the form of foregoing more profitable alter-
natives. 
The variation in the internal rates of return from individual allot -
ments is very high. A glance at Table 2 shows that out of 24 allotment 
plans, 11 plans have positive rates, and 13 have negative returns. This 
is expected because of extreme diversity in topography, climate, vegeta-
tio:l c.nd rol:!..tic:1l cor..di!:::cns Fr~~n:ilir..g ir. different areas. 
The enormous variability in the internal rates of return from 
investments on different allotments cannot be explained with the existing 
information. There are many factors which are responsible for large 
negative returns. Consideration other than efficiency of federal invest-
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ments probably explains part of t he variability . Such results were not 
expect ed , and no attempt was made to collect the information whi ch wo uld 
have answered these questions. These results demonstrate a need for 
col l ec ting further information. 
The lis t of 24 plans cove red the avai l able management pl ans in the 
three states where systems have been fully implemented. There are many 
more plans where specialized grazing sys tems ar e just now being imple-
mented, which, of course, could not be included in this sample . 
Changes in profits of private ranche r s 
The estimated coefficient s of the livestock production functions 
using the factor shares method for both the years 1965 and 1970 are 
given in Table 3 below. 
Table 3 . Coefficients of the Cobb-Douglas produc tion functions 
Coefficient Standard error 
1965 
"1 . 2 9317 (.261768) 
" 2 .55042 ( .28983 
"3 . 25407 (.21958 
l:a. 1. 09766 
1 
( .57574 
t970 
" 1 .26581 ( .195159) 
" 2 .48745 (.2654 52) 
" 3 .20461 ( .195468) 
l:a. .957869 
1 
( .43683 ) 
These results confirm the assumption of constant returns to scale. 
Coming from 26 observations, a1 and a3 significantly differ f r om zero 
at the 85 percent and a2 at 95 percent significance level. a . from 1 
1970 data are not significantly different from those of 1965 (that is 
6ai is not significantly different from zero as shown in Table 4). 
Table 4. Changes in ai from 1965 to 1970 
44 
6ai Standard error 
.02736 ( .117048) 
. 06297 (.217319) 
.04936 (.165574) 
6A Using the ai from 1965, the estimated -A· = 0.11399 (~ . 169042). This 
technical change is neutral with respect to the inputs. The Hicksian 
definition of neutrality (Nadiri,l970, p. 1143) requires that in the 
a 
case of a production function (F) with inputs K and L, a 
t 
oF <J F ( aK . K/ aL . L 
K 
with L constant. In the three input model of this study and with a dis-
crete change , this condition would be satisfied if 
aY 
xl ax1 xl 6 [ 0 with constant. aY x2 
"Xz x2 
Dividing the numerator and denominator by Y in the above expression, the 
necessary test for neutrality reduces to whether 
0 
and similarly whether 
11 
' 
" 1 = " 1 "1 11 (- -,) when 
"z "z "z 
"z = 
" 3 
xl 
0 with X held constant, 
2 
0 with 
xz 
X held constant. 
3 
"1 and "z are from the year 1965 
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and 
"1 ' and "z 
' 
are from 1970. Table 4 above shows that /1ai is not significantly differ-
ent from zero at the 99 percent confidence level (that is a1 = a1 ' and 
a2 = a2 '). Therefore, 
With regard to the constancy of factor ratios, the technical change was 
measured by determining the /1Y at the base year levels of inputs. 
were tested for both 1965 and 1970, and were found to be not signifi-
cantly different between the two years. This means that the slopes of 
the two production functions in two years were tested along the same 
expansion path. 
The neutrality of technical change might appear surprising in the 
face of all the talk about large capital outlays on grazing allotments. 
But if the source of the capital investments is kept in view, there is 
nothing surprising about these results. Fences and other capital out-
lays over and above the normal growth of ranching firms have been mostly 
carried out from federal funds, which are external to the production 
function. 
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. t>n t> A The change in profit per unit of output 1s -y ~ ~ . Py. The aver-
age price of yearling steers sold by the ranchers included in this study 
was $.2763 per pound, which is equivalent to $.32 in 1970 prices. 
t>n Therefore, -y ~ .036477. 
This means that on the average, rancher's profi ts improved by 3.6 
cents per pound of livestock produced. It seems the ranchers would not 
oppose the introduction of the specialized grazing systems on economic 
grounds. In fact, some ranchers have welcomed the systems, and a few 
requests to the BLM for the installation of specialized grazing systems 
have originated from the ranchers themselves. However, some skepticism 
also exists about the systems. After ruling out nonprofitability of the 
systems to the ranchers, it is likely that any opposition is merely 
resistance of a conservative section of the society to any radical change 
in their way of life, and the way they have done things in the past. 
Nlother plausable explanation could be fear of the dilution of already 
shaky semi-legal rights of grazing on publi c lands due to heavy BLM 
investments on public lands. Also, this study does not show the interim 
losses (during 1966-1969) in livestock weights, which the ranchers might 
have suffered due to sudden change in management practices. 
Cost of public goods 
From the nonuniform production of Q1 as depicted in Figure 1, an 
equivalent uniform annual production of Q1. comes to 36,290.4 AUM's. A 
comparable total annual cost (TC) is $63,506.27. Annual figures for Q1 
and TC were calculated as below: 
n Q. 
E _1__,..) 
j~-s (l+i}J 
i 
1 - (l+i)n 
where i 
s 
and TC 
.051251 
n 
c. 
__l_ 
j~-s (l+i) j 
( i ) 
--- n 
1 - (l+i) 
the actual or estimated production of Q1 in jth year 
actual or estimated cost in jth year 
period of installation (5 years) 
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The summation of present values for TC was calculated using the computa-
tional formulation employed on page 32. The term ( __ i__ n) is the 
1 - (l+i) 
value of an annuity for a period of n years which is worth $1 today. 
Therefore, the cost of the increase in Q1, (Cb) = llTC = $1.7435. From the 
llQl 
grazing fee schedule of Table 1, the average fee the BLM is expected to 
receive is $1.21 per AUM. 
[ (P Qln) (i) + ~ PQlJ" 
(1 + i) 111 j=l 
This effective price (PQ1) was calculated as 
( 1 . ) l (i) 
(l+i)J 
where PQln $1.36 = price of Ql in the nth year 
.05125 
PQlj price of Ql in j th year as given in Table 1 
number of the price keeps rising. 2 m years 
If production of forage is treated as the only activity for which 
investments in grazing systems were made, the effective grazing fee would 
have to be $1.74 to break even. This means that grazing fees would have 
to be raised by 1l£ from the assumed effective price of ~· Even if 
1This discount rate is declared by the Water Resources Council each 
year. It varies with the average yield of marketable long-term securities 
(15 years and over) of the United States Government for the previous five 
years. However, it is not equal to this average yield. The average yield 
determines only the direction of the change. 
2 . p 
P Qln (1) is a simplified version of ~ 
(l+i)m i 
1 
PQln (1 - ~) 
i 
grazing fees are raised to their full parity of $1.36 immediatel y 
(which is unlikely), there would be a gap of 38¢ which would never be 
bridged. This is because $1.3 6 is the fair market price of Q1 af t er 
accounting for user costs on public land s. The ranchers cannot be 
expec ted to pay 38¢ over a nd above t he pr evail ing market price . It 
seems , therefore , that as purely a forage raising device, the BLM in-
vestment s in specialized grazing systems will never pay off. Even if 
the actual cost of an additional AUM was char ged to the ranchers, it 
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does not mean tha t each rancher should be charged equally . The s tud y 
r esults are an average figure. To be r ealistic, each plan will have 
to be considered on its own merits . Separate considera tion of grazing 
fees for each grazing system plan would require considerable additional 
effor t on the part of the BLM. 
Facing these results the BLI! will pro bably put its role as a pro-
ducer of jointly produced public goods (B1) assoc i ated with Q1 in the 
forefront. The net price per bundle of these public good s (B1) is 
$ .53. Is this cheap or cos tly ? We don't know, because the exact 
magnitud e of 81 is not known. Indications are that it i s positive . 
Some of these goods can be measured in physical units. For example, 
acre f eet of erosion reduction, pounds of litter increase, cubic feet 
reduction in peak f l ow of run off , e t c. But , even these have not been 
exc hanged in the market a ttd as s uch do not serve as marke table units 
and their value in exchange cannot be determined. The determination 
of the "f a irness" of the cost of a unit of Bl i s left to the political 
process. Wi th increasing concern over the deterioration of the environ-
ment, a single positive effect of soil s t ability (of the many which the 
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BLM claims to have achieved in eac h case on the 695,024 acres of public 
land covered by this study) may be enough to cover this cost. The 
ELM's list of the positive nongraz ing benefits falling into category 
81 includes wildlife habitat improvement, better watershed protection , 
c loser rancher-ELM cooperation, enhancement of recreational values , 
improvement in aesthetic values, soil stability and stability in live-
s toc k operations . 
Now turning to the ELM ' s role as an agent of the sovereign, the 
value of the externa lity ( 6~ ) is positive; i.e., $.03647. The total 
value of the externality is therefore (y) (.0364) = (3,785,860) (.0364) 
= $138 ,070. Y is the estimated total livestock production3 dependent 
on the public land s studied. With 36,290.4 AUM's of Q1 , the value of 
this externality per unit of Q1 is S - $3.80. This amount to obtaining 
a bundle B1 at a net cost of $1 .74- $1.36 = $.38 which improving the 
incomes of ranchers by $3.80 for a net gain of $3 .80 - $.38 = $3.42 
to the sovereign . It is up to the congress to decide whether this 
positive ex t ernality should be recognized as a goa l of the federal 
investments in specialized grazing systems. 
3rt was not possible to collect exact information on the actual 
pounds of livestock produced by all the ranchers involved. For estimat-
ing the total livestock production, advantage was taken of the fact that 
forage available from public lands is a limiting factor in most ranch 
operations. Production is dependent on the forage from public lands 
during the critical periods. It was found the maximum number of live-
s t'Jr..k gr:az~rl in!3tearl. of t:he numbP.r 0f AUM' s ':'rod11ced ~xplainect thP. live-
stock produced by the ranchers. This linear relationship determined by 
a least squares regression turned out to be Y = 260 N where N is the 
maximum number allowed to graze BLM lands. In this regression, the 
intercept was forced to zero to eliminate the dependence on number of 
firms involved. The F value for this relationship was 21.9 and R2 = .47. 
The coefficient for AUM's was not significantly different from zero. 
An earlier regress ion with a constant term had the coefficient for AUM's 
significantly different from zero and R2 of .69 hut a r egression with a 
constant term cannot be logically used for determination of Y at allot-
ment levels. 
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CONCLUSION 
The internal rate of return on the BLM grazing system investments 
over an area of approximately 695 , 024 acres in Idaho, Nevada and Utah 
is 2.37 percent. This is less than half the rate federal investments 
are expected to return (as measured by the federal government ' s cost 
of borrowing). More than half of the twenty four allotment plans have 
negative rates of return. Out of thirteen plans with negative rates 
of return only five have positive net returns and the rest have negative 
net returns. 
Specialized grazing systems have improved the amount of aggregate 
profits of the private ranchers studied by 11.4 percent. Federal invest-
ment in specialized grazing systems may be justified if income distri -
bution is considered a valid reason for such activities. If the stabili-
ty and continuity of their operations is assur ed, ranchers may be able 
to pay increased grazing fees. In view of the fac t that under public 
pressure the government has decided to withdraw rancher benefits in the 
form of grazing fees lower than market rates, income distribution appears 
to be poor grounds for justification of federal investment. Also, 
given the income benefits to ranch operations, ranchers themselves would 
undoubtedly want to invest in grazing systems on federal land . However, 
rancher investment is unlikely since the BLM is already discouraging 
p·c iva t e permanent improvements on public lands. 
From the point of view of the BLM as a proprietary agent, the real 
cost of obtaining an increased bundle of non-grazing benefits produced 
jointly with an AUM of increased forage product ion is $.53. A grazing 
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fee of $1.74 per AUM would be required for the BLM to break even on 
investments in grazing systems. This is in spite of the fact that large 
federal investments in necessary range improvements already existed be-
fore the implementation of the specialized grazing systems. It appears 
the investments in grazing systems on unimproved ranges are not 
justifiable in terms of direct returns to the BLM. 
If the externality to the ranching segment of society is internal-
ized, specialized grazing system benefits discounted at the public dis-
count rate more than outweigh the costs. Many questions are left un-
answered such as quantifying and placing a dollar value on rangeland 
benefits claimed by the federal agencies. 
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Appendix A 
The Specialized Grazing Systems 
Grazing systems are planned programs of livestock management to 
accomplish a desired result. They are designed to provide for the re-
quirements of soil, plants a nd livestock. Soil is a complex body with 
varied physical, chemi cal and biologica l characterist i cs . Its condition 
is reflected in its products; viz ., plants, water, e t c . The simplest 
of all its characteristics, the moisture content, can make a tremendous 
difference in the results of l ivestock trampling . Livestock need feed 
a nd water to put on weight and produce ca l ves. Plants hold the crucial 
central posi tion in this three way relationship. Primary plant growth 
takes place from s tored carbohydrates (c 6H12o6). The l evel of stored 
carbohydrates during the growing season depends on the uses of carbo-
hydrates in respiration and growth and the replenishment of the storage 
through photosynthesis. The process of photosynthesis uses ca rbon 
dioxide and water to , produc e . carbohydr ate and oxygen in the presence of 
s un light . (Meyer, Anderson and Bourning, 1960, p . 133). 
673 kg-ca l. of radiant ener gy 
The factor s affecting the process of photosynthesis are presence of co2 , 
l eaf surface, .:light intensity, water suppiy, temperature, soi l nutrients 
a nd physiological efficiency of plants. Of these factors l eaf surface 
is the dir ect food of the lives tock. Water supply, tempera tur e and soil 
nutrients a r e affected indirectly. 
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Carbohydrates are genera lly stor ed in und er ground organs such a s 
root s , tubers, rhizomes, stolons ; j n crown or s t em leaves of herbac ious 
spec i es and also in twigs of woody plants. Thes e reserves are used for 
initia l growth in spring, for rapid growth during the year a nd for 
secondary growth in the f all. The plants fall back upon these reserves 
for new photosynthetic tissue when overgrazed. The reserves are lowest 
when rapid growth occurs in spring . The r e lations hip between herbage 
yield and carbohydr a t e r eserves i s s hown i n Figur e 1 be lm;. 1 
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Figure 9. Relationship between average total available carbohydrates 
(TAG) in roots and crowns of squirreltail and average 
length of current year's growth (CYG). 
Livestock relish new succulent growth. The protein content and vitamins 
are also high in the early stages of growth. But carbohydrate reserves 
are generally the lowest a t this stage. "It is believed t hat a plant 
that prolongs replenishmen t of the reserves following initial growth is 
more susc eptible to grazing stress during the growing period than a 
1This fo l lows Patrie I. Coyne (1969). 
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plant that replenishes its reserves rapidly following initial grol'th" 
(Cook, 1966). p. 8). Likewise, a plant grol'ing rapidly in the early 
stages is more susceptible to early grazing than a plant growing slowly 
in early stages. 
Since vegetation of each rangeland is composed of different species 
of grasses , forbs and woody plants and since each species has different 
growth patterns and carbohydrate and nutrient cycles, it is impossible 
to provide for the requir ements of all species as well as the livestock 
and soil at the same time. Various grazing systems attempt to use the 
fragmented information regarding each element of the ecosystem a nd pro-
vide for the r equirement of at least key species. The advanced grazing 
systems provide plants a chance for at taining vigor, seed maturity , 
and regeneration after certain intervals of time on one part of the 
range while other parts are being grazed. This is illustrated by 
Figure 2 put up by the BLM offices in Nevada. 
FIRST YEAR SECOND YEAR THIRD YEAR 
Figure 10. A three pasture rest rotation system. 
A. Full Grazing: Provides maximum forage for livestock. Improves plant 
composition by using all forage plants. 
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B. Grazing af t er seed ripens: Ungrazed plants gain vigor and produce 
seed more readily during the growing season. \<hen the seed is ripe 
it is knocked to ground early, trampled in and planted by livestock. 
Grazing after seed ripens ensures establishment of new seedlings. 
C. Rest during entire season: The rest pasture is the one grazed when 
seed was ripe the year before. Plants are protected from all live-
stock grazing during seedling establishment, and older plants gain 
vigor. This rest is essential for a healthy rangeland. Reproduced 
from the BLM manual, Figures 3 and 4 are examples of a five pasture 
rest rotation system and a five pasture year long, seasoned rotation 
system (BLM, 1968. p. 3- 8) . Figures 5, 6, and 8 are examples of 
grazing systems from allotmen ts in Utah, Nevada and Idaho. These 
systems are based on the assumption that plants can recover from 
even severe use by a periodic rest . 
Pasture 
(*) = 3 month period, (l) 
(2) 
• Graze D Rest 
Pasture Pasture Pasture 
cool season grass growth period. 
warm season grass growth period . 
Figure ll: Five pasture grazing system - year-long grazing 
subject to severe drought periods. lvarm season 
and cool season grasses both important on allotment. 
"' 
,. 
Pasture Pasture Pasture Pasture Pasture 
v. '+ -' 
1 G RV RS RR RR 
2 RV RS RR RR G 
3 RS RR RR G RV 
I 
4 RR RR G RV RS 
I 
5 RR G RV RS RR 
G = Graze until direct utilization, RV = Rest for vigor 
RS = Rest until seed ripe, then graze, RP = Rest for Preproduction 
Figure 12. Five pasture system where key species require one 
season of rest for restoration of vigor and two 
seasons for seeding establishments. 
"' Ln 
Yr 
Graze until Rest until seed Rest until 
1 flowering ripe, then graze Rest flowering, then 4/1 t o 6/15 9/1 to 10/31 graze 6/16 to 
18/30. 
Rest unti l seed Rest until Graze until 
2 ripe, then graze Rest flowering, then flowering 9/1 t o 10/31 graze 6/16 to 4/1 to 6/15 
8/30 
Rest until Graze until Rest until seed 
flowering, then flowering ripe, then 
3 Rest graze 6/16 t o 4/1 to 6/15 graze 9/1 to 
8/30 10/31 
Rest until Graze until Rest until seed 
4 flowering, then flowering ripe, graze Rest graze 6/16 to 4/1 to 6/15 9/1 to 10/31 
8/3:) 
Figure 13. Four pasture rest-rotation system included in Smith 
Cottonwood Al l otment Management Plan, Elko, Nevada. 
"' 
"' 
FIELDS RECEI VING TREATMENT 
TREATMENTS YR . l YR.2 YR . 3 YR.4 
:-lmnll'i'"'"'="'''JI""''~"';::'r.,.; __ ~""'u"' · , ____ .. """-=-:<v~y:,, 1~.'"~o/"~• NW I sw I MID I NE I ~"" 
REST FOR VIGOR I SE 
:---r::ST FOR SEED RIPE I}..~_ .. GRAZE. .. - .. ~l NE 
EST FOR SEEDI NG ESTABLISHMENT 
E 
''-C:J)>\'=t.:J'3:; ~<:;;:!~~""-0 ~~~=·~ '2!..<=>, ~~L"~~@: 
4/ 16 5/1 6/ 1 7/1 8/1 9/1 9/30 
Figur e 14 . Fi ve pastures (NW, SE, NE , MID, SW) rest rotation grazing sys t em implemented on 
Richfie l d Al lotment , Shoshone, Idaho . Grazing season is f r om 4/16 to 9/30 
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PASTURE 1/4 
PASTURE 1/3 
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2 LS F 
3 F R 
4 R s 
S = May 1 t o May 25 
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PASTURE PASTURE I 
F 
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1/2 Il l 
THIRD YEAR FOURTH YEAR 
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R s 
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Res t 
Figur e 15. Rest r ot a tion gr a zi ng sys t em i mp l emented on Yost 
Pastures , Salt Lake Di str ic t, Ut ah. 
"' 
"' 
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Appendix B 
Method of Data Collection and Compilation 
Questionnaires were prepared to collect information on costs and 
production from both ranchers and the Bureau of Land Management District 
Ma nagers. These questionnaires were developed after a preliminary field 
trip to the Fillmore District. Bureau of Land Management District 
offices at Fillmore, Salt Lake City and Brigham City in Utah; Boise, 
Idaho Falls, Shoshone and Burley in Idaho; and Ely, Elko and Winnemucca 
in Nevada were contacted for information on grazing systems. 
Each of these offices were asked for all the management plans pre-
scribing specialized grazing systems. Plans covering only cattle ranges 
were asked for. Only the plans implemented between 1965 and 1970 were 
selected. Then the Bureau of Land Management offices were asked to 
supply the costs of improvement projects put in for the systems along 
with the year of completion and maintenance responsibilities. The 
Resource Chief and Area Managers of each District jointly estimated the 
costs of development of the plan, maintenance costs, life expectations 
on projects and also the expected further increases in forage production 
from each plan area as a result of new grazing systems. A photocopy of 
each plan selected was obtained. The costs of projects and figures on 
actual production were obtained from the ELM records. Twenty-four 
allotments were covered. 
Addresses of the ranchers operating in the area were acquired from 
the Bureau offices . The operators were contacted by telephone to arrange 
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appointments after explaining the nature of information sought and also 
after assuring them that individual names and information would not be 
made available to any other agency . Personal interviews were then held. 
Ranchers invariably needed elaborate explanations of some items of the 
questionnaire. Both records and estimates were used by ranchers to 
answer the questions. Only the ranchers who had owned the present ranches 
for at least the last six years were interviewed. In the case of 
individual allotments, the sample of owners was 100 percent. But in joint 
allotments , the owners interviewed varied from 3 to 50 percent of the 
permittees operating in an allotment. 
Compilation. All the costs and returns were converted into 1970 prices 
using the wholesale price indexes of all commoditieJ. The value of 
ranchers inventories of r a ngeland privately owned, BLM, State land and 
Forest Service permits, mother herds, horses, bulls, fences, buildings 
and equipment were included in fixed capital costs . The annual costs on 
supplemental feeds, hay, salt, repair of fences, watering facilities, 
buildings, BLM, Forest Service and state grazing fees, private rentals 
of pastures, veterinarian charges, value of the aftermath and all other 
miscellaneous cash costs other than labor were included in the working 
capi tal. All the cost of labor, owned and hired was added up as labor 
costs. The ranching operation was separated from grain and hay raising 
ac tivities of the ranchers. This explains the inclusion of the cost of 
feeds, hay and aftermath of grain and hay fields in the working capital 
1Index of wholesale prices up to 1969 was taken from statistical 
abstracts for the U.S., 1970, and that for 1970 was taken from Survey 
of Current Business. April, 1971. 
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because the rancher could have sold these for cash if they had not 
been used for his own operations. 
The livestock weights produced were converted to yearling steer 
weights by dividing the gross revenues from sale of all categories of 
livestock by the average price of yearling steers. The average price 
of yearling steers was determined by L psf · ysf where Psf is the 
E ysf 
price per pound of yearling steers received by the fth firm and Ysf 
is the pounds of live weight of yearling steers sold by the fth firm. 
!:, PRODUCTinN ! ATTM\ !:, COST IS) 
CLASS I 
ALLOTMENT PERHIT 1965 1970 EXPECTED IN YEAR INVESTMENTsa ANNUAL .., 
IDAHO "' o' 
Pleasant View 17,438 16,551 15,034 17,438 1980 156,076.92 4,330. 0 >-' (1) 
Kerr 627 1,155 2,596 3,330 1971 10,070 300.0 
"" Goose Creek 9,918 4,539 5,447 9,918 1977 21,116.95 800.0 
Bute Canal 1,528 658 924 1,526 1972 8,247.46 -400.0 
Valley 988 483 655 755 1974 2,510.40 55.0 
Richfield 3,360 - 1,257 1,757 5,000 1978 7,972 -60.0 
Shoshone 12,702 10,196 10,234 20,000 1975 36,721 -250.0 
"' ~ c Sl El "' 
" >-'· 
" 
NEVADA "' 
" 0 Spratling 1,014 990 1,205 1,570 1980 750 500.0 
Horace Smith 2,100 2,100 2,079 2,520 1971 17,896.85 500.0 
Jordan Valley Neadow 19,233 10,294 10,926 13,110 1975 98,097.78 500.0 
Hillow Creek 814 1,342 1,476 1974 2,450 500.0 
Long Canyon 1,675 1,569 1,871 2,432 1977 29,916 750.0 
And or no 873 995 1,269 1,326 1974 18,890.55 1,000.0 
Flatcreek 4,550 2,425 3,012 4,217 1972 6,659 750.0 
Buffalo 338 296 345 379 1974 15,740.70 750.0 
0. 
c 
~ (") (1) 18: 0 "' " " 0 "' 0. " c 0. (") 
n 0 
f-'· 0 
0 (/) 
" 
rt 
Heusser Nountain 1,933 1,416 1, 784 1,933 1973 13,092.87 760.0 (/) 0 
Steptoe Unit 4,471 2, 779 4,066 4,446 1976 19,411.78 1,235.0 ,. 0 
"' 
..., 
Smith Creek 4,202 5,386 5,386 5,689 1974 8,188.40 1,645.0 
" )Q n Cold Creek 9,471 9,471 12,7 99 12,799 1970 9,542.11 1,072.0 "' 
,. 
(/) 
"' Duck Creek 2,471 1,359 1,412 2,471 1975 10,063.78 1,630.0 0 
"' 
UTAH 
Yost Pastures 800 1,206 1,206 1970 4,537.33 260.0 
" 
,... 
:;:: 
"' 5: 
Finlinson 283 238 60 100 1975 550.00 200.0 :> >-' Southtract Cattl~ 2,340 2,475 2,475 1970 3,632.56 950.0 >-' 0 
Carter Unit 2,738 743 1,132 1,132 1970 8,800.40 250.0 n El 
"' 
aThese are total costs of investment incurred in the installation period (1970 prices). " 
.._, 
n N 
(/) 
RANGE B.L.H. F.S. MOTHER HORSES BULLS FENCES BUILD- EQUIP 
LAND PERHIT PEIUHT HERD 
--- -- ---
INGS HENT 
1 38,000 49,500 58,800 3,000 6,000 0.0 6,200 >-l 0.0 10,000 
"' cT 2 30,000 105,000 59,500 55,500 8,000 20,000 8,000 5,000 7,000 ,... 
3 47,100 37,035 11,250 126,000 4,000 9,800 0.0 2,900 9,000 "' 
4 36,000 18,905 5,225 60,000 1,500 4,500 2,500 5,000 5,700 :=" 
5 12,810 22,000 2,000 25,900 1,400 4,000 0.0 800 2.070 
6 200,000 119,016 6,534 175,000 9,000 23,600 0.0 14,500 5,000 
"' "' 
" " 7 76,000 28,800 0.0 100,000 900 7,500 0.0 20,000 5,200 § § 8 56,000 37,500 0.0 35,000 1,200 3,250 0.0 5,000 3,800 
"' "' 9 85,400 59,400 0.0 25,000 3,000 7,500 0.0 5,000 5,955 " " 
10 53.910 36,200 0.0 112,870 3,125 19,200 2,662 960 9,645 0 0 
11 37,000 18.700 1,000 29,920 1,000 1,750 2,790 2,500 14,750 '"" '"" 
<: 0 12 20,550 18,300 10,125 40,960 800 5,850 0.0 500 3,830 
"' 
0 ,... 
"' 13 6,400 5,300 0.0 7,950 1,000 848 0.0 2,500 2,720 
" 
,., 
~ 14 6,000 10,000 0.0 22,500 1,400 1,500 960 1,000 652 "' "' 0 "' 15 42,658 20,450 18,100 45,000 800 3,000 0.0 8,000 9,940 '"" " p. 16 180,000 20,000 14,200 60,000 500 3,000 0.0 5,000 1,050 "" >"· :o<l 17 350,000 9,405 0.0 90,000 1,500 9,000 0.0 0.0 8,500 " "' "' ,., 18 0.0 10,100 o.o 40,000 650 1,200 100 6,000 9,900 p.
" 
" 19 0.0 10,080 0.0 21,600 500 2,000 0.0 2,120 2,081 0 
" 20 30,000 25,080 0.0 37,125 950 3,825 o.o 2,100 2,830 "' "' >"· 0 21 7,900 7,800 o.o 15,7 50 800 1,800 0.0 500 8,800 ,., 
'"" 
"' 22 17,250 17,250 0.0 15,000 1,200 1,200 0.0 3,000 8,900 ,... :o<l 
"' 23 0.0 1,000 0.0 16,800 500 500 o.o 1,250 4,533 
-;::: 
" 
" 24 11,040 10,100 0.0 15,150 800 1,500 0.0 0.0 2,141 
"' 
:T 
"' "' 25 0.0 2,020 0.0 16,425 125 1,200 165 400 2,300 ,:;; 
" 
"' 26 0.0 1,750 0.0 5,600 200 500 300 1,500 1,100 t:J 
0 ,... 
,... 
"' 
" 
"' 
..., 
w 
FEED a FENCE OTHER BLM FS FEES RENTAL FUEL VET AFTER-
REPAIRS REPAIRS FEES & STATE PRIVATE 
-- -
MATH .., 
"' 0" 1 16,010 120 550 297 0.0 0 . 0 675 550 5,480 ..... 
"' 2 7,836 0.0 630 273.70 0.0 0.0 600 500 4,800 
3 16,015 400 1,100 1,267 240 o.o 1,000 36 2,000 
4 16,184 500 150 387.30 109 3,000 800 250 200 
"' 5 5, 401 90 100 494.70 86 0.0 140 20 1,110 
" 6 16,502 . 93 1,000 2,000 2,909.8 382.8 0.0 2,400 250 201.6 §
"' 7 1,380 444 600 1,061 0.0 0.0 225 50 3,500 ... 
8 2,825 200 200 217 .5 o . o 0.0 300 100 0.0 0 9 3,527 . 5 0 . 0 o.o 0.0 0.0 1 960 180 800 
"' 10 22,300 0.0 300 798 0.0 1,225 2,400 500 3,500 < 
" 11 5,584 550 100 305.4 147.5 35 700 25 880 ... 
.... 12 6,315 . 2 1,000 100 354 238.68 54.74 890 176 3,584 
"' 0" 13 2,445 . 9 0.0 0.0 58.2 0 . 0 0. 0 500 :o6 576 . 5 ..... 
"' 14 4,121 0.0 o.o 48.3 0.0 900 600 150 300 0 15 33,580 200 150 101.7 351.16 48 574 75 5,000 0 en 16 9,565 100 40 181.59 370 . 0 54 242.5 500 1, 800 M en 17 15,370 500 500 381.15 56.6 0.0 1, 665 200 2,000 
18 11,575 412 300 245.7 0.0 0.0 300 50 900 ..... 
"' 19 5,662.2 220 350 159 0.0 0.0 320 42.5 1,512 
"' 
"' 20 8,225 573 150 201.30 0.0 0.0 200 188 1,055 
21 4 ,025 266 0 . 0 130.24 o.o o.o 51 6 100 630 t:> 0 22 9,380 498 o.o 83.10 0.0 0.0 600 100 860 ..... 
..... 23 10,009 0.0 0 . 0 36.30 0.0 665 224 250 1, 008 "' ... 24 4,658 110 . 8 0.0 145.5 0.0 0.0 720 25.25 840 .84 en 
25 8,856 200 so 69.3 o.o 1,314.0 400 40 235 
26 2,930 50 20 50.1 0.0 150 30 20 150 
3
Feed includes hay, grain, salt, maintenance of bulls and horses not sent on the public ranges . 
..... ,. 
RANGE hLM F. SERVICE MOTHER HORSES BULLS FENCESc BUILD- EQUIP-
.... LAND PERMIT PERMIT HERD 
--- --- ---
INGS MENT 
" o" 
.... 
1 148,000 60,250 3,600 4,800 "' 0.0 28,500 11,050 0.0 17,000 
2 30,000 <:oo,ooo 115,000 105,000 8,000 11,500 6,000 10,000 9,000 ?' 
3 55,000 59,310 11,250 180,000 4,500 10,800 8,500 56,000 20,000 {J) 4 45,000 24,111 5,225 151,250 l,500 10,800 1,100 5,000 12,000 
" 5 17.080 25,000 2,000 40,000 2,400 5,400 0.0 800 1,560 §
" 6 325.000 148,770 9,990 142,360 15,000 28,350 0.0 9,500 12,800 ... 
7 45,500 108,000 26,125 286,000 1,750 20,000 2,000 20,000 11,650 
0 8 70,000 42,500 o.o 40,000 2,100 4,950 1,500 5,000 2,650 1-t> 
9 190,400 110,000 0.0 157,500 4,000 8 ,250 0.0 7,000 9,000 <: 
" 10 60,900 54,300 0.0 91,710 3,750 12,350 0.0 2,700 6 ,960 .... 
" 11 3 9. 7 50 210,375 1,380 37,400 1,000 3,200 170 3,500 17,700 
"' 12 52,800 21,960 10,530 46,025 1,000 6,500 2,000 1,000 4,195 0 1-t> 13 14,600 15,500 0.0 37,200 1,000 2,480 0.0 1,700 3,425 
"1 14 10,000 10,500 0.0 32,500 1,400 4,200 700 3,000 1,105 .... 
" 15 58,023 30,650 30,000 72,000 1,100 4,500 0.0 8,000 9,940 
"' a. 16 210,000 27,000 22,100 115,000 400 3,000 0.0 5,000 6,500 n 17 374,400 22,130 0.0 174.250 1,500 29 ,000 0.0 0.0 4 ,500 
" 18 0.0 10,100 0.0 53.500 1,200 1,300 1,100 6,000 4,875 
19 0.0 14,400 0.0 18,800 400 2,000 0.0 2,500 1,579 
20 60,000 24,750 0.0 53,400 2,000 5,500 0.0 3,300 2,583 
21 8,390 8,580 0.0 21,500 3,200 2,000 0.0 500 11,300 
22 17,250 17,250 0.0 40,000 1,400 6,600 0.0 5,100 6,700 
23 0.0 1,120 0.0 6,800 250 800 o.o 1,200 1,443 
24 4,300 4,140 0.0 39,000 1,000 1,200 0.0 0.0 1,037 I~ 25 0.0 3,520 0.0 22 ,500 125 1,500 300 2,000 500 26 0.0 8,000 0.0 10,000 200 600 0.0 1,500 266 
bThe serial numbers here bear no relationship to serial numbers of grazing allotments. 
o" 
There-
fore no attempt should be made ot identify the cost and production data of specific individual 
ranchers. Also the ranches studied do not cover all the allotment plans studied for determining 
" the internal rate of return . 
"' 
cThese are the values of fences not included in permi t value and value of fences on owned 
range and buildings. 
FEED FENCE OTHER BLM F.S. RENTALS FUEL VET AFTER-
REPAIR REPAIR FEES STATE PRIVATE MATH 
FEES PASTURES >-0 
"' -- -- - --- 0' 
..... 
1 23,020 230 750 530 0.0 1,520 950 940 5,480 ro 
2 22,850 1,300 1,500 1,085 424.20 0 . 0 900 500 4,800 '? 
3 28,662 4,100 3,000 402 0.0 0.0 2,400 375 3,500 
4 30,524 550 1,200 784.54 185 4,000 1,600 700 2,000 til c 
5 6,905 80 200 801.68 114 0.0 200 100 2,520 § 
"' 
6 11,928.74 1.000 2,000 6,022.16 587.4 0.0 3,000 250 162.48 
" 7 3,300 700 1,300 1,618.32 100 0.0 258 1,200 4,500 
0 8 4,490 100 100 374.0 0.0 0.0 375 200 150 
"' 9 13,653 .50 360 600 751 0.0 1 2,400 700 1,350 < 
"' 
10 9,510 0.0 1,000 1,046.76 0 .0 1,475 2,400 57 5 4,372 
" I"• 11 8,240 650 100 552.2 222 0.0 875 35 880 
"' 0' 12 6,350 400 0.0 532.4 357 . 69 o.o 905 48.76 4,000 ..... 
ro 13 6,000.15 100 0.0 269 0.0 0 . 0 300 248 1,302 
C"l 14 20,248.40 0.0 0.0 105.6 o.o 1,500 700 400 6,300 0 
til 15 48,680 200 0.0 238.92 582.16 0.0 600 150 5,000 .... 
til 16 13 '005 130 145 381. 92 .545 0.0 253 700 2,400 
17 36,375 0.0 0.0 942.48 57.6 0.0 97 5 1,700 450 ..... 
"" 18 10,086 912 600 279.18 0.0 0.0 400 so 1,020 
"" 0 19 7,955 296.50 300 233 .64 300 0.0 600 20 1,300 
20 11 '870 600 180 273.24 0.0 0.0 200 344 1,350 t;j 0 21 4,015.80 257.35 0.0 107.70 0.0 0.0 531 150 860 ..... 
..... 22 22,564 855 0.0 247.28 0.0 0.0 1,200 600 1,200 
"' 
" 23 6,617.32 120 o.o 101.52 0.0 450 325 240 1,120 
"' 24 7,384 0.0 50 174.24 0.0 0 . 0 249.4 200 900 
25 10,886 27 300 154 0.0 2,400 450 92 260 
26 4' 970 65 0.0 88 0.0 210 30 60 250 
"" <Y> 
Table 10. 
1965 
5,602.61 
11,565 
11,139 
4, 772 
4,865 
14,487 
1,400 
5,215 
9, 961.5 
14,426.25 
5,999.0 
8,184 
1,297.5 
8,297.5 
8,180 
9,450 
3,290 
12 ,477 
3,507 
2, 710 
4,138 
6,960 
4,023.7 
3, 97 5 
2,980 
716 
Labor Costs (Dollar s ) 
1970 
5,876.27 
12,050 
12,120 
6,344 .7 5 
7,350 
22,980 
6,989.5 
5 , 982 . 5 
11,223 
17,655 
16,555 
9,090 
1,870 
13,500 
6 , 9f,r) 
10,120 
5,680 
13,640 
5,294 
4,540 
6,200 
8,980 
2,200 
4,688 
4,920 
2,820 
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Table 11. 
1965 
29,370.40 
24,051.00 
49,902.00 
34 , 861.5 
19,205.12 
104,582.00 
41,400.00 
12,825.00 
20,250.00 
44,845.98 
16,308.75 
19,499.6 
9,354.5 
12,750 .00 
50,781.00 
36,939.00 
55,040.00 
14,000.00 
14,726.6 
15,862 . 0 
8 ,470. 70 
9,350.0 
10,562.5 
17,106.0 
14,102.0 
3,840.0 
Value of Sales of Livestock (Dollars) 
1970 
59,618 . 78 
46,016.50 
25 ,530.00 
55,062.50 
25,268.08 
350,468.65 
102,500.00 
21,397.00 
61,277.20 
67,693.99 
27,291. 25 
21,565.26 
26,903.49 
30,764 .00 
7 5, 714.00 
61,119.60 
126,80Q.OO 
15 , 890.00 
15,042.00 
20,880 . 49 
15,289.04 
35,971.86 
12,055.40 
17,740.92 
19,714.25 
6,200.00 
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Appendix E 
Questionnaire on Cost of Production of Livestock by Ranchers Using 
Public Lands Administered by Bureau of Land Management 
Year 
---
A. Fixed capital 
1. Rangeland owned acres 
--
at $ 
---
$ 
---
T/E* ___ 
2. BLM Permit A. U.s __ , at $ __ $ 
---
T/E 
3. Forest Service No. 
---' 
at $ 
---
$ __ T/E 
4. Mother Herd No. 
---' 
at $ 
---
$ 
---
T/E ___ 
5. Horses No. at $ __ $ 
---
T/E 
6. Bulls No. 
---' 
at $ __ $ __ T/E 
7. Buildings: i-__ , $_ expected lif e =__years T/E ___ 
ii-__ , $ 
--' 
expected life _ __years T/E ___ 
iii- $ __ , expected life ___years T/E __ 
8. Fences: BLM land __ $ __ , expected life _years T/E ___ 
on own land __ $ __ , expected life __years T/E ___ 
9. Watering: BLM land_$ __ , expected life ___years T/E ___ 
facilities 
on own land_$ __ , expected life ___years T/E ___ 
10. Equipment 
Item No. Make! Original price Present value Life Exp. % ag'=: use 
Year paid $ estimate Est. for L.S. 
oneration 
i 
_li 
*T Information from actual transaction 
E Estimated present value by the rancher 
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10. Equipment (cant) 
Item No. Make Original price Present value Life Exp. % age use 
Year paid $ estimate Est. for L.S. 
operation 
iii 
iv 
v 
B. Working Capital (Cash cos t s other than l abor). 
1. Feed 
i. Hay 
ii. Grain $ 
iii . Silage $ 
iv. 
v . 
2. Sa lt 
3. Fence r epair ma t erial $ ____ 
4. Watering fac ilities r epair materia l 
5. BLM g ra z ing fees 
6. Forest Service G. fees 
7. St a te land lease fees $ 
8. Privat e pas ture r entals 
9 . Fu el f or machinery $ 
a . 
b. $ 
c . 
10. Veterinary expenses $ 
11. Pasturing on aftermath of hay a nd grain 
12. Repa ir of equipment 
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13. Repair of buildings 
14. Feeding bulls and horses not includ ed in (1) 
above 
15. Any other 
C. Labor Self Hir ed 
l. General care taking and winter feeding man days. 
2. Dr iving/t ru cking up to the range man days. 
3. Feeding and salting on rangeland man days . 
4 . Moving livestock between pastures man days. 
5 . Rounding up and driving or trucking 
back man da ys . 
6. Fence and water facilities repair man days. 
7. Branding ma n days 
8 . Any other man days 
D. Prices of factors 
1. Borrowed fixed capital: Amount $ ____ , Sour ce ____ in ter est rate __ _ 
2. Owned fixed capita l : Amount $ ____ , Alte rnate ____ __ 
Inves tmen t 
Opportunity cos t _____ _ 
3. Borrowed cash cos ts: Amount$ _____ , Source ___ interest rate __ 
4. Cash on ha nd : Alternate investment in mind ___ Opportunity cost_ 
5. Labor wage rate: a) Self$ ____ b) Hired$ _____ per man day. 
6 . Fu" J. pd.ce a) 
b) 
c) 
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E. Product and Product Prices 
Item No. Weight Price Total $ 
Produced Sold 
i Steer calves 
ii Heifer calves 
iii Cows 
iv Yrg steers 
v Yrg heifers 
vi Bulls 
General description of the operation: 
Appendix F 
Questionnaire on BLX Cost-Benefit Data on 
Implementation of Grazing Sys tems 
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District __________________________ ~Allotment ____________________________ _ 
A. Cost on development of the system 
(Additional information 
B. Cost of Implementing the System 
1. Selling of the project (manhour s on meetings) 
2 . Fencing Exp. lif e 
3. Water development Exp. life $. ____ _ 
4 . Trail building Exp. lif e 
5. Seeding spray Exp. life 
6. Administration costs Exp. life 
7. Repairs 
8. Any other 
Benefits 
1. A. U.M. ' s produced before the sys tem 
2. A.U.M. ' s produced after the system 
3. Expected A.U .M. ' s to be maintained ______ s tarting in year 
4. Other benefits 
i. 
ii. 
iii. 
Remarks 
Appendix G 
1 Definitions of Technical Terms 
ADJUDICATION. The allocation of rights following a hearing of con-
flicting claims either by n court or a hearing board. May refer to 
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grazing, water or any other rights. Also, the apportionment of grazing 
use on public range among eligible applicants . 
AFTERMATH. Regrowth of range or artificial pasture forage after 
grazing or harvesting. 
ALLOTMENT. An area designa ted for the use of a prescribed number of 
cattle or sheep, or by common use of both und er one plan of management . 
ANIMAL UNIT MONTH . The amount of feed or forage required by an 
animal unit for one month. Not synonymous with animal month. 
COMMENSURABILITY . Capacity of a permitee ' s base ranch property to 
support permitted livestock during the period such livestock are off 
public land. 
CONTINUOUS GRAZING . Allowing domestic livestock to graze a specific 
area throughout the grazing season. The term is not necessarily 
synonymous with yearlong grazing. 
DEFERRED GRAZING. Discontinuance of grazing by livestock on an area 
for a specified period of time during the growing season to promote 
plant reproduction, establishment of new plants, or restoration of 
vigor by old plants. 
1These definitions are taken from A Glossary of Terms Used in 
Range Management (American Society of Range Management, 1964). 
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DEFERRED ROTATION GRAZING. Discontinuance of grazing on various parts 
of a range in succeeding years, al lowing each part to rest successiv e ly 
during the growing season to permit seed production, establishment of 
seed lings , or restoration of plant vigor. Two, but usually three or 
more, separate units are required. Control is usually insured by 
unit fencing, but may be obtained by camp unit herding. 
FORAGE. (N) All browse and herbaceous food that is available to live-
stock or game animals. It may either be used for grazing or harvested 
for feeding. (V) Act of consuming forage. 
GRAZING DISTRICT. An administrative unit of Federal range established 
by the Secretary of Interior und er the provisions of the Taylor Grazing 
Act of 1934, as amended. Also, an administrative unit of state, private, 
or other rangelands, established under certain s tate laws . 
GRAZING LICENSE OR PERMIT. Official written permission to graze a 
specified number, kind and class of livestock for a specific period on 
a defined allotment. 
GRAZING SYSTEM. The manipulation of livestock grazing to accomplish 
a desired result. 
HABITAT. The natural abode of a plant or animal, including all biotic, 
climatic, and soil conditions, or other environmental influences 
affecting life. 
MULTIPLE USE. Harmonious use of range for more than one of the fo l lowing 
purposes: grazing of livestock, wildlife production, recreation, water-
shed, and timber production. Not necessarily the combination of uses 
that will yield the highest economic return or greatest unit output . 
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RANCH. An establishment with specific boundaries, together with its 
lands and improvements, used for the grazing and production of domestic 
livestock. 
RANGE. All land producing native forage for anima l consumption, and 
lands that are revegetated naturally or artificially to provide a 
forage cover that is managed like native vegetation. Generally con-
sidered as land that is not cultivated. In Taxonomy, the area or 
areas throughout which a plant or animal taxon occurs. 
RANGE IMPROVEMENT. (Physical) Any structure or excavation to facilitate 
management of range or livestock. (Biological) An increase in the 
grazing capacity of range. Improvement in range condition. 
REST-ROTATION GRAZING. An intensive sys tem of management whereby 
grazing is deferred on various parts of the range during succeeding 
years , allowing the deferred part complete rest for one year. Two or 
more units are requir ed . Control by fencing is usually necessary on 
cattl e range, but may be obtained by herding on sheep ranges. 
ROTATION GRAZING. Orderly sequence of use when each subdivision is 
both grazed and deferr ed during the same grazing season or calendar year. 
ROTATIONAL DEFERMENT. A grazing system in which one or more parts of 
the range are rested duri.ng the grmV"ing season each year; and rotational 
use of other segments of the range are not necessarily planned for. 
WILDERNESS. An uncultivated, relatively uninhab ited re~ion usua llv in 
an undis turbed condition. 
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